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This paper advances a theory of the supply of inside money that is squarely based on 
optimisation, and which sets out from the question, ‘As outside money has an 
opportunity cost that a mere promise to pay outside money does not, why is outside 
money used at all?’. The theory identifies the nominal rate of return on capital as the 
key determinant of the supply of inside money. So just as the nominal rate of return 
on capital is the cost of demanding money, so the nominal rate of return is identified 
here as the reward for supplying (inside) money. And just as the demand for money is 
negatively related to the nominal rate of return on capital, so the supply of inside 
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This paper advances a theory of the supply of inside money (see Coleman 2007 for an 
expanded treatment). The theory is one that is squarely based on optimisation, is 
impelled by Hicksian themes of the competition between inside and outside money, 
and which sets out from the question, ‘As outside money has an opportunity cost that 
a mere promise to pay outside money does not, why is outside money used at all?’.
1 
 
The theory of inside money advanced here identifies the nominal rate of return on 
capital, ι, as the key determinant of the supply of inside money. So just as the nominal 
rate of return on capital is the cost of demanding money, so the nominal rate of return 
is identified here as the reward for supplying (inside) money. And just as the demand 
for money is negatively related to the nominal rate of return on capital, so the supply 
of inside money is positively related to the nominal rate of return on capital.  
 
1 The benefits of the supply of inside money. 
 
We suppose that money provides a benefit by reducing the frequency of costly 
liquidations of capital; a benefit that is represented by the appearance of real money 
holdings in the utility function.       
 
    11 ( , ,... ; , ,... ) TT Uu C CC h hh =  
      C = consumption  
      h = holdings of real money balances 
      T = final period; the current period is indexed as zero 
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We make the assumption that money holdings, h, can consist of either outside money 
or inside money.  
 
Outside money is whatever is universally accepted, without cost, as tender. This is 
typically state money today; ‘fiduciary’ notes and coin. 
 
Inside money is a (credible) promise to pay outside money. More precisely, it is a 
credible promise to pay outside money to the bearer of the promise, on the demand of 
the bearer, and at no cost to the bearer.
2 These promises will circulate within that 
network of people who have been persuaded of their credibility. We will usually think 
in terms of ‘individuals’ issuing these promises, but we can think - Kaldor style 
(Kaldor 1970) – of ‘firms’, who pay their workers and suppliers in ‘chits’, which 
circulate within that network of businesses who have been persuaded of their 
credibility. 
 
As inside money is a credible promise to pay the bearer outside money (at no cost), 
the benefit of an extra unit of inside money is the same as the benefit of an extra unit 
of outside money, Uh.  
 
Given this perfect substitutability of inside and outside money, there is from the point 
of view of the money holder, just ‘money’, and the money holder will hold money 
until the marginal utility of money relative to the marginal utility of consumption 
equals the nominal rate of return on capital.   5
 





ι =       
 
     = h U marginal utility of real balances 
     = C U marginal utility of consumption 
    ι =nominal rate of return on physical capital
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2 The costs of the supply of inside money. 
 
From benefits of inside money, we turn to its cost. 
 
The principal cost of the supply of inside money will be assumed to arise from 
making any promise to pay a credible promise to pay. Anyone can promise; but not 
everyone’s promises are credible. There are costs in making a promise a believable, 
namely the costs of providing evidence of the solvency and honesty of the issuer of 
the promise. Evidence of solvency includes audited accounts, and perhaps investment 
in ‘conspicuous capital’ (e.g. ostentatious buildings). Evidence of honesty might 
include demonstrations of the willingness of persons of known honesty to associate 
with, and speak for, the issuer of the promise. These evidences are costly, and we will 
call these costs ‘credibility costs’.  
 
There is a second cost of the supply of inside money that we will sometimes consider. 
This turns on our assumption that the promise to pay money is a promise to pay 
money at no cost to the bearer, where ‘cost’ includes inconvenience and time loss to   6
the bearer in being paid. The provision of honouring a promise in way that is both 
convenient and timely to the bearer presumably also involves cost to the issuer. We 
might call these ‘convenience costs’. 
 
There is, thirdly, the matter of ‘operational costs’. It may cost money to produce the 
physical embodiment of promises, and to produce them in a way that is not worth the 
while of a forger successfully forging them. 
 
We suppose that all three costs increase as the issue of promises requires. This is 
fairly obvious with respect to convenience and operational costs. With respect to 
‘credibility costs’ there are two reasons one has to spend more on credibility to 
increase issue; 
  
1.  ‘Credibility Deepening’. As the magnitude of these liabilities rise there must 
be more scrutiny to establish whether the issuer can and will meet these 




2.  ‘Credibility Widening’. If the issue is to expand, the network amongst which 
these promises are accepted must expand. More persons must be persuaded 
that the issuer is solvent and faithful to his promises.  
 
The increasing costs of issuing premises can be represented by letting Z be the total 
costs of issuing n of inside money. 
   7
  
     () Z Zn =      '0 Z >      (1)   
    issue of inside money in real terms n ≡
5 
 
The marginal cost of issue will prove to be significant, and we symbolise it z. 
 








     (2) 
ζ (n) = Z’(n) is the cost of establishing the credibility of the nth dollar promised. 
 
Several points about z should be noted. 
 
•  ζ is dimensioned like the interest rate. It’s a cents per period per dollar type 
variable. But instead of being a rate of return, it is a rate of outlay. 
 
•  ζ will be positive at n = 0. There is a minimum marginal cost of inside 
money. 
 





. The marginal cost of establishing credit worthiness is increasing in n 
(‘increasing marginal costs’), at least for ‘low’ and ‘high’ magnitudes of n. 
This assumption is required for the existence of a maximum in the households’ 
inside money issue problem. 
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Figure 1: The marginal cost of inside money rises with inside money 
 
 




There is the question of how long credibility lasts, once it has been acquired. Once a 
promise has been made credible, how long will it be credible for? Forever? This 
period? A finite number of periods? We will begin by making the fairly extreme 
assumption that credibility lasts only ‘one period’. Promises made this period are 
credible for redemption at the opening of the following period, but are otherwise have 
zero credibility in the following periods. 
 
This assumption will be relaxed later. 
ζ (n) 
n 




These cost functions may differ from person to person. The cost is presumably lower 
for persons both wealthy and trusted, than for persons that are both poor and 
distrusted. The cost may be so high that it is prohibitive to issue any.  
 
3 The optimal supply of inside money. 
 
The condition of optimisation 
 
The individual’s maximisation problem is,  
 
 
Choose  11 , ,... ; , ,... TT CC C hh h 




Period 0:    11 () PCHK PP Z n P wP KP KMN ρ− ++ + = + + ++ 
 
Period 1:    1 1 11 211 1 1111 1 1 () PCHP KP Z n P wP KP KHNN ρ ++ + = + + + +−
       
     e t c         10
          ( 3 )  
 
    M = endowment of outside money at opening of period zero 
  K  =  capital 
    w = real wage 
  ρ = rate of profit 
    H = holdings of nominal money balances 
   
 
The period budget constraints can be consolidated into a single budget constraint, 
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   π = rate of inflation 
      m = endowment of outside money in real terms 
 
Optimisation with respect to n implies, 
 








   (5)   11
 
The equality says that inside money is issued until the marginal credibility cost, ζ, 
equals the nominal rate of return on capital, ι.  
 
This result can be rationalised by three equally valid arguments.  
 
The Argument from Increasing Capital Holdings. 
 
Suppose that promises to pay are issued, but are immediately used to purchase capital. 
This capital is then sold next period to meet the redemption of the promise to pay. 
 
The addition to costs is ζ. There is no benefit from any reduced frequency of capital 
liquidations, since the quantity of money held is no higher. But there is a benefit from 
the capital acquired. This is the income per dollar of capital that has been acquired, 
which is  ι. So matching cost with benefit, 
 
  ζ(n) = ι         (6) 
 
Notice that the income per dollar of capital is nominal income per dollar. This reflects 
the fact that, if inflation is positive, not all of the proceeds of the sale of capital need 




The above argument has an implication of considerable significance: there is an 
aspect of ‘printing money’ in issuing inside money. There is a net income to be   12
derived from doing it. The issuer gains a capital asset, and receives it income, less the 
costs of establishing credibility. Plainly, allowing people to build their own printing 
presses, and spend the outside money they print, is socially wasteful. And similarly 
there is waste in persons issuing inside money: resources are devoted to establishing 
credibility for the purpose of avoiding the opportunity cost of outside money. But the 
opportunity cost of outside money is purely a private cost, and involves no social cost.
 
Thus the reduction in the holding of outside money, that the issue of inside money 
permits, produces no reduction in social costs, but it does involve costs. Inside money 
is socially wasteful. 
 
The Argument from Increasing Money Holdings. Consider a person who issues an 
extra quantity of promises to pay, holding consumption and capital holdings constant. 
The addition to costs is ζ. The additional benefit lies in the reduced frequency of 
capital liquidations, allowed by the higher quantity of money held. This benefit is the 
marginal utility of money, Uh.
7 Thus 
 
  Net Benefit of Marginal Issue of Inside Money= ( ) hC Un U ζ −  (7) 
         
Inside money is issued until the net benefit of an extra issue is zero, 
 
 
      ( ) 0 hC Un U ζ − =  
or,  







ζ      (8) 
 
But utility maximisation also implies, 
 














Substituting the optimisation condition for money demand into the optimisation 
condition for inside money supply yields the result, 
 
 
  ζ = ι  
  
An argument from consumption. Suppose the issue of money was used to purchase 
one unit of consumption in the current period. This would have a credibility cost, z. It 
would also entail a reduction in consumption in the next period to meet redemption. 
The net benefit is, 
 
 













Ensuring this is zero, and recalling 1 [1 ] CC UU ρ = + , yields the same result. 
 
The expression for supply   14
 
The optimisation condition can be inverted to relate n to ι; that is, to derive a supply 
equation for inside money. 
 
     ( ) n ζ ι =  
    
1() n ζ ι
− =       (10)   
    












>0     (11) 
 
In terms of a figure, 
 







n   15
 
 
The positive relation between inside money and the nominal rate of return can be 
rationalised in several ways. It can be understood in terms of the depreciation, in the 
real terms, of the issuer of inside money’s liability that occurs under higher inflation, 
and so higher ι . The more one’s liability declines in real terms, the more incentive 
one has have to issue the liability in order to acquire some capital. 
 
The positive relation between inside money and the nominal rate of return can also be 
understood in terms of the Argument From Increased Money Holdings, we may 
reason: ‘An increase in the rate of return on capital reduces the amount of money 





≡ , including 
extra inside money. That rate of return now exceeds the marginal cost of circulation 
of a dollar, ζ. Therefore the supply of inside money will be expanded until it rises so 
high that ζ reaches η (= ι). To put it another way, as the rate of return on capital rises, 
the implicit rate of return on money rises. This amounts to the benefit of persuading 
people of your credit rises; so you do persuade more people.  
 
4 Banknotes, Bank Deposits and Inside Money  
 
How does the theory of inside money developed here relate, if at all, to the categories 
of inside money typically observed?  
   16
The inside money we have dealt with is not bank money - banks have not been 
mentioned. But, historically, inside money has been commonly bank money: either 
commercial banknotes (in the 19
th c) or bank deposits (in the 20
th). So there is a 
distance between the categories deployed in the theory, and the categories of 
commercial life. Can the theoretical categories - promises to pay the bearer be related 
– be related to bank money? Can the analysis of promises to pay be construed to be an 
implicit analysis of bank money? 
 
It is easy to ‘tell stories’ in which the category used here– a promise to pay the bearer 
on demand –can be related to banking categories, and in a way such that the bank is 
merely a superstructure. We could suppose, for example, that every individual owns 
their own bank, BankofMyself. Instead of issuing to the public promises to pay, each 
individual borrows from their respective BankofMyself, which issues BankofMyself 
banknotes to the same value that they spend. Banknotes are now the form of inside 
money, but absolutely nothing of any substance has changed. 
 
BankOfMyself do not exist, but only because of economies of scale, just as backyard 
steel foundries do not exist on account of economies of scale. We can imagine a group 
of persons reducing the costs of obtaining credibility for their promises to pay by 
grouping together, and forming a ‘bank’. Instead of an individual issuing a $100 of 
promise to the bearer, they issue $100 of promise to intermediary – a ‘bank’ - that in 
turn issues them $100 of promises of ‘the bank’ to pay to the bearer. These promises 
to pay the bearer are ‘bank notes’, of the kind that circulated in the 19thc. It is the 
bank that does the promising, but the foundation of that promise lies in the promises 
made by the set of persons who have issued promises to the bank. The bank note,   17
then, is just a way of tying together the promises of that set of persons. The credibility 
of the note still turns on the credibility of the persons. Nothing essential has changed.  
 
Can deposit money also be rationalised in terms of the concepts of this paper? 
 
To think about deposit money, imagine that bank notes do not circulate, but are left in 
the custody of the bank. To be quite concrete about it, we might imagine a series of 
labelled bins, each bin pertaining to the certain person nominated on its label. In any 
given bin are placed all the notes, issued by whatever bank, that are the possession of 
the person named on the bin’s label. The amount in a given bin might be thought of 
the ‘deposit’ of the person bin pertains to. When this person wishes it, they may 
instruct the bank to transfer part of their note holdings to a different bin. This captures 
the situation of chequable deposits. The key point is that the acceptability of this 
payment depends on the credibility of the persons who are ultimately the banks 
debtors. 
 




It is very likely that the cost of an issue of any given size is reduced by the scale of the 
wider economy. To issue $10,000 is presumably more costly when money demand is 
$10m than when it is $10B.
 8 
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One convenient way of capturing this phenomenon is to suppose an x percent increase 
in issue implies an only x percent increase in the cost of issue as long as total moneu 
demand also increases by x  percent. Equivalently, the average cost of issue per unit 
of issue is purely a function of the ratio of issue to total money demand. 
 




















ζ =      ( 1 3 )  
so 




ι =      ( 1 4 )  
This implies, 
 
     
1 '( )
j nz h ι
− =      (15) 
10 
 
This extension involves two significant revision of the theory.  
 
  1. The supply of inside money is now unit elastic to total demand for money. 
  This unit elasticity also implies a unit elasticity between h-n and h. That is, a 
  unit  elasticity    between m and h. To illustrate, if 
1 Z nh



















. A ‘money multiplier’ like relativity   19
  between total money and outside money emerges, although with a completely 
 different  rationale. 
  2. The elasticity of the supply of inside money to the nominal rate of return on 
  capital, is no longer necessarily positive. A large enough (negative) sensitivity 
  of total money demand to the rate of return can outweigh any (positive) 
  sensitivity of inside money to the rate of return. More formally, the semi-
  elasticity of the supply of inside money will be negative if the positivised 
  semi-elasticity of total money demand exceeds the partial semi-elasticity of 
 inside  money  supply.
 11 
  3. n as a proportion of h may be subject to a maximum. If 
1 Z nh





















Credibility Decay  
 
We have supposed that outlays on credibility only secure credibility for a single 
period. But credit does not decay 100 percent period. The proofs of credibility (that 
amount to proofs of solvency and honesty) must have some endurance over time.
 
Increasing credibility today may favourably impact on credibility tomorrow. 
Therefore, the higher the issue yesterday, the less the cost of accrediting a certain 
magnitude of n today. 
 
One way of modelling the endurance of credibility is to suppose,  
   20







=      (16)   
 
f  is a measure of the rate of survival in the ‘quantity of credibility’ in inside money. 
If  f = 0, there is no survival in credibility beyond one period (as we have assumed so 
far). But if  f  =1, there is complete survival, and any outlays on credibility impact 
equally on the issue of inside in all future periods.  
 
If we choose units so that h =1 then, 
 
    1 ()
jj j Z zn f n − =−      (17) 
   
For any profile of credibility outlays, to spend more on credibility in period 0, 
increases the supply of issue (and so holdings) in all future periods, but at a 
diminishing rate.  Therefore, 
 
net benefit of extra spending on credibility
2
,1 ,2 [ ....] hh h
n
Uf U f U U c
Z
∂





At the point of optimum issue the marginal net benefit is zero,   
 
   
2
,1 ,2 .... 0 hh h Uf U f U U c ζ ++ + − =      (18) 
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   where  1 '( )
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13 
 
The supply of money is now a function of the (weighted) sum of discounted future 
nominal rates.  
 
The full impact of any increase of the nominal rate of return on the supply of inside 
money now comes with a lag. 
 
Honouring Within Period Redemptions 
 
We have assumed that the whole of the issue circulates within the period it is issued, 
and none of it is presented within that period for honouring in terms of outside money, 
(or presented as payment to the issuer for a debt owed to the issuer). But presumably a 
proportion of these notes, v, will be presented within the period. How will this affect 
the analysis? Using the Argument from Money Holdings, we can say that to issue $1 
is not to increase money holdings by $1, but by only $[1-v]. Therefore the 
optimisation condition is, 
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       (20) 
 
or, equivalently, 
ζ(n) = [1- v] ι       (21)  
 
 
Thus n is now a function of nominal rate of return on capital factored down by the 
redemption rate, v. 
 
Constant marginal costs of issue 
 
We have assumed that the marginal cost of issue  rises with issue. But optimisation is 
consistent with marginal costs being constant over some finite range, as long as it is 
rising outside that range. 
 
Figure 3: Supply of Inside Money with Constant Marginal Costs of Credibility 
 






At the critical rate, the supply of inside money can be any magnitude, within the range 
of constant marginal costs.  
 
The existence of a flat portion of the supply curve of inside money captures the kind 
situation speculated about by Kaldor in his critique of monetarism (Kaldor 1970). The 
supply of money has no unique magnitude at the critical rate. There is no such thing 
as ‘the money supply’. 
 
Fixed costs  
 
We have implicitly assumed there are no fixed cost in establishing credit. But it is 
plausible that there are some fixed costs in establishing credit. This means that there 
money supply any amount 




will be a nominal rate of return on capital that is so low, such that if the rate falls 
below that then there is a discontinuous jump from positive issue to zero issue. In 
other words, there is ‘shut down’ rate of return on capital, such that if the rate falls 
below that rate no inside money is issued. 
 
Non-neutralities in supply 
 
We have assumed that the real supply of inside money is completely independent of 
the nominal price level. But there will be such a dependence if we plausibly allow that 
the costs of securing the credibility of any given size of issue falls with the wealth of 
the issuer. Suppose 
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This reformulation does not affect the first order conditions as the wealth of person j 
is not j’s choice variable. Therefore, 
 
      (, ) nW ζ ι =      ( 2 3 )  
 
But if  W ζ < 0 then higher wealth increases supply of n for a given ι. As wealth is 
partly composed of outside money, we can conclude  / WP ∂ ∂ < 0. Thus the supply of 
inside money contracts for a given P. 
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Interest earning Inside Money  
 
We have assumed that the only way to induce other persons to accept one’s promises 
to pay is to go to expense of demonstrating one’s credibility to them. But there is 
another way of inducing others to accept one’s promises to pay: pay others to accept 
one’s promises to pay. To illustrate: if the public believes, in the absence of outlays 
on credibility costs, that there is a 10 percent risk that one’s promise will not be 
honoured, then paying $10 on every $100 promise to pay that is issued to compensate 
them for the risk. This payment takes the appearance of ‘interest’ 
 
Does this possibility of securing circulation by ‘risk compensation’ interest undermine 
the theory of this paper? To explore this, suppose that the population consists of two 
categories. Category One makes up a fraction 1-p of the population, and pays all of 
their promises. Category Twp makes up a fraction p of the population, and pays none 
their promises. In the absence of credibility outlays each person’s category 
membership is private information of the person. The benefit of issuing money in 
these circumstances is, 
 
Benefit = hn c Ui U −   
where 
     i n = p          (24) 
 
 
Let us also suppose that for the first category ζ < p. Then the category 1 people will 
establish their credibility rather than pay risk compensating interest. The remaining   26
persons will then be identified as persons who do not honour promises so none of 
their promises are accepted. We are back to the theory of this paper. 
 
In ignoring inside money issued on the basis of risk compensating interest payments 
we are making some sort of implicit assumption about the cheapness of establishing 
probity. 
 
Systemic Risk and ‘Bank Runs’ 
 
We have ignored that the possibility (and likelihood) that the total quantity of inside 
money exceeds the total amount of outside money. In such a situation it is impossible 
for all promises for outside money to be simultaneously honoured. In other words, it 
is possible that no promises have credibility. This is the vicious equilibrium of bank 
runs. 
 
Distinct Demands For Inside and Outside Money 
 
In this analysis there is no ‘demand for outside money’ distinct from some ‘demand 
for inside money’. Inside and outside money are perfect substitutes from the point of 
view of the holder, as the benefit of money to its holder regardless of whether it is 
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The paper has advanced a theory of the supply of inside money that turns on the thesis 
that inside money is supplied until the cost of making an extra dollar sufficiently 
credible to be acceptable for circulation equals the income that an extra dollar of 
wealth can earn. The upshot of this assumption is that the supply of inside money is a 
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1 See Hicks on the competition between inside and outside money. (Hicks 1939, 
1989). 
2 Economic historians have extensively documented cases where the population at 
large have used as a medium of exchange such promises to pay. See Shann (1938 pp. 
52-3), and O’Connell and Reid (2005). 
3 It proves convenient to measure the nominal rate of return on capital as the 
increment in nominal value, between period zero and period one, expressed as a 
proportion of the nominal value in period one (rather than in period zero) Thus 
[1 ][1 ] 1 1 1 1
ρ πρ π ρ π ρ π
ι ρπ
ρπ ρ π ρ π
++
≡= + − ≈ +
++ + + + +
. 
4 The magnitude of n is assumed to be known or knowable. 
5 N is the nominal issue. Z is related to the real circulation of notes, N/P ≡ n, not N. 
The same nominal issue may be considered either very extensive or very slight, 












−+ + =    
 










−+ + − =
++ +
 
   30











= + −= −=
++ + +
. 
7 The benefit of the additional issue of inside money equals the marginal utility of 
money in the current period only, as on present assumptions, credit decays at a rate of 
100 percent per period. It is the higher holding of money allowed by the issue of 
inside money that makes it possible to honour the issue at the opening of the next 
period, without cost to next period consumption. 
8 The more commercial traffic there is, the easier it is to circulate promises to pay. 
The quantity of one’s promises that any circle of creditors will bear will rise the 
greater their demand for money. 
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12      
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Substitution of the first order condition for consumption ( 1 [1 ] CC UU ρ = + ), and 
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